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Introduction  
While the United States is currently focused on the liberation of Iraq and the establishment of a 
working democracy there, the legacy of a small nation in the Levant has been ignored. Many 
studies show that Lebanon was a viable democracy prior to the start of the civil war in 1975. The 
infrastructure and institutions for democracy are still present, making Lebanon the most likely of 
the Arab states to succeed in transitioning to democracy.  
Considering the U.S. national security strategy of propagating democracy throughout the world, it 
is in the United States ’ best interest to consider Lebanon. Successfully supporting a return to 
democracy there would not only lessen its appeal as a haven for terrorism, but would also provide 
the United States with a democratic Arab ally in the Middle East.  
This essay identifies path dependence as a significant factor behind U.S. policy of 
disengagement toward Lebanon since 1983. I argue that a new path of engaged political activism 
could bring more positive results for both Lebanon and the U.S.. A viable U.S. policy aiding 
Lebanon ’s democracy and free market would further the U.S. in accomplishing its national 
security strategies in the Middle East.  
Path Dependence  
Path dependence is a theory that emerged from the field of economics. The theory implies that 
when markets make remediable errors in the choice of products, in the development of products, 
or another aspect of an economic decision, they seem unwilling to change such initial choice 
even when better choices come along. Neither do markets remedy the error when it can be 
overcome. Markets seem to be locked in to a particular path, and all their other choices become 
dependent on the initial choice.[1] The point in time or the event when that initial choice or 
decision was made is commonly called a “critical juncture.” The decision made during this critical 
juncture can have important influences, sometimes irreversible ones, on future decisions. These 
future decisions then are said to be path dependent on the initial decision.  
The decisions made during a critical juncture may be conscious or arbitrary. The effects are the 
same. A commonly cited example in the business world is the dominance of the VHS format over 
Beta in the video cassette recorder business.[2] The decision by early adopters to embrace the 
VHS format led to future adopters and inventors to follow and market the same VHS format. Beta 
may have been superior, but the market could not go back once the choice was made at that 
critical juncture.  
There are limited cases outside economics where path dependence has been studied. In 
comparative politics, James Mahoney explains how choices made by Central American countries 
at critical junctures during the nineteenth-century liberal reform period established the direction 
for Central American development. Mahoney shows why Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua developed into different types of political regimes, based on decisions 
these countries made at crucial times in their history. Their choices regarding state and agrarian 
development early in the nineteenth century established the development of three types of 
political regimes in the twentieth century—military -authoritarian (Guatemala, El Salvador), liberal 
democratic (Costa Rica), and traditional dictatorial (Honduras, Nicaragua).[3] 
Path Dependence and U.S. Policy toward Lebanon  
U.S. policy toward Lebanon prior to the Beirut bombings in 1983 appeared to be characterized by 
cooperation, mutual trade, and the promotion of democracy and free enterprise. This policy was 
centered on the strategic importance of Lebanon. But after the 1983 bombings that killed over 
300 U.S. servicemen and other multinational force peacekeepers, the U.S. pulled out, changing 
its policies and completely ignoring Lebanon. This arguably contributed to the Lebanese state’s 
demise in the 1980’s and the prolonged civil war. The war ended with Syria entering Lebanon 
militarily and exercising hegemony over political leaders, allowing preferred violent groups such 
as Hezbollah to continue in existence or flourish.  
President Reagan’s decision to pull U.S. military personnel from Beirut, a policy that came to be 
known as “cut and run policy,” heavily influenced subsequent U.S. policies toward Lebanon. The 
president’s decision triggered a dependent path, limiting subsequent decision makers’ policy 
choices, and negatively affected subsequent U.S. policies. The Beirut bombings and the 
subsequent policy were mentioned and considered in every major policy discussion. Path 
dependence theory thus helps to explain U.S. policy toward Lebanon from the Reagan 
administration to the present.  
The Reagan Administration (1981–1988)  
During its first three years, the Reagan administration’s policy toward developing states was 
characterized largely within the context of expansionist Soviet foreign policy. This meant military 
and economic support to governments willing to ally with the U.S. Lebanon ’s Christian 
(Maronite)-led government became closely identified with accepting such U.S. support. Reagan 
was committed to bringing democracy back to Lebanon and keeping it away from the Soviet orbit.  
Further, Lebanon was in the forefront of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Southern Lebanon became the 
headquarters for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and therefore the site of intense 
hostilities between Israel, Israeli-backed militias, and the PLO. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon 
for the second time after the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to London. The 
Israeli army surrounded west Beirut and demanded the evacuation of the PLO and Syrians from 
Beirut. France, the U.S., and Italy sent armed forces to oversee the evacuation of Palestinian 
forces. The PLO’s Yasser Arafat and most of his men were evacuated, leaving mostly women 
and children in the refugee camps.  
Several events deeply challenged the Reagan administration. Bashir Gemayel, the main U.S. 
supporter and friendly to Israel, was assassinated, leaving a void in the Phalange (Maronite 
Christian) faction’s leadership. Shortly thereafter, Israel allowed Phalangist militias to enter the 
Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatila that it was guarding. The Phalange then massacred 
hundreds of civilians, the women and children who were left in the camps. The U.S., France, and 
Italy were again forced to send a multinational force (MNF) to help stabilize the situation and try 
to restore order to the war ravaged country.  
After the massacres, the Lebanese government, now under Bashir’s brother Amin, clearly 
represented only Maronite interests, and was viewed as allied to Israel. The Lebanese 
government had lost credibility, especially within its growing Muslim population. The Lebanese 
government troops were seen as Phalange militias fighting against Muslim militias.  
Despite the loss of credibility, the government of Gemayel remained the only semblance of a 
legitimate state. For the Reagan administration, Lebanon ’s sovereignty rested with that 
“Phalangist” government. Lebanese Muslims, Druze, and other Christian factions fighting that 
government were therefore seen as on the wrong side of U.S. policy. The U.S. could not afford 
Lebanon falling into communist or Muslim extremists’ control; and Gemayel’s government was all 
they had. The Reagan administration, believing Gemayel’s government would fall without U.S. 
military help, approved the shelling of Muslim areas from U.S. warships. Such action identified the 
U.S. not as a supporter of the Lebanese state, but a supporter of the Christian Phalangists.  
Such support would cost the lives of many Americans throughout 1983. On April 18, the U.S. 
embassy was bombed by Lebanese allies of Iran. Syrian involvement was also suspected. It 
seemed Syria was determined to keep Lebanon in a state of chaos to keep any fighting and 
factionalism away from Syria itself. Lebanon was the buffer from Israel and the PLO and anybody 
else in the fight. The embassy bombing cost the lives of 63 people, seventeen of whom were 
Americans. On October 23, a suicide bomber drove a truck loaded with 12,000 pounds of 
explosives to the U.S. Marine compound at the Beirut airport. The bomber detonated the 
explosives, collapsing the Marine headquarters building to rubble, and crushing many to death 
inside. A total of 242 people were killed—220 U.S. Marines, 18 sailors, three soldiers, and one 
Lebanese. The FBI reported this was the largest non-nuclear explosion at that time.  
Reactions from the Reagan administration during the six months following the attacks were 
meant to show U.S. determination against “terrorist activities.” High ranking U.S. officials, 
including then vice president George H.W. Bush, visited the region to initiate talks with Middle 
East leaders. A series of National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) were immediately 
formulated, affirming U.S. commitment to Lebanon ’s independence and security. In these 
NSDDs, the U.S. recognized and acknowledged confessional militias as relevant, not for ending 
the civil war, but as assets for protecting American lives.  
NSDD 117 instructed the American contingent of the MNF “to pursue a policy of vigorous self-
defense against all attacks from any hostile quarter.”[4] This was an escalation from NSDD 103 
which stated U.S. concept of operations “should be one of aggressive self-defense” and “should 
demonstrate … impartiality in the confessional conflict.”[5] The directive authorized destructive 
fire against a full range of foreseeable threats regardless of who fired against U.S. interests. It 
also pressured the Lebanese government to “undertake a more aggressive security posture in 
and around Beirut against radical Lebanese and foreign elements which pose a security risk to 
the MNF.”[6]  
Other directives and policy guidance followed. Each seemed to attempt to secure a handle on the 
Lebanese crisis, but each also brought unintended consequences. The focus of the directives 
became increasingly about combating terrorism and protecting U.S. peacekeepers and other 
assets. Military operations, mainly bombings from U.S. Navy destroyers, were approved for anti-
terrorism reasons. The military rules of engagement focused on defending the official American 
presence in Lebanon; U.S. naval and tactical air power could be employed at will and the military 
could fire whenever hostile fire directed at U.S. personnel or facilities was identified. Many rounds 
were fired, directed at terrorists, which also brought collateral damage. In the process, U.S. 
credibility as an honest broker for peace among the many factions fighting in Lebanon, as well as 
confidence in U.S. commitment to Lebanese sovereignty, eroded.  
U.S. policy toward Lebanon after the October 1983 Beirut bombings also became characterized 
by increased cooperation with Israel and more overt hostility against Syria. In the process, 
Lebanon was trapped in the middle of two powers vying for regional supremacy. Further, the U.S. 
became more involved with Iran while waging a war against terrorism. Again, the future of the 
state of Lebanon was trapped in the middle as the radical group Hezbollah was funded and 
supported by Iran. The rhetoric for supporting Lebanese sovereignty by U.S. administration 
officials was still there; but the willingness to put words into action may have been insufficient.  
With an increasingly pro-Israel stance, hostilities between Syria and the U.S. could not be 
avoided. The Reagan administration was convinced Syria had something to do with the 1983 
bombings and resented Syria ’s support for terrorist groups. But Syria was still perceived as vital 
to the peace process, and the Reagan administration largely refrained from direct action against 
Syria. Instead, the administration let the Lebanese government do the fighting and concentrated 
on aiding the Lebanese government’s military in the fight. NSDD 123, signed by Reagan in 
February 1984, approved a military plan that provided for “possible actions the United States 
Government could take to assist the Government of Lebanon in responding to the changing 
threats and military requirements.”[7] Among other stipulations, the U.S. was to provide 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism training, modern artillery ammunition, and other U.S. 
equipment in order to deter firing on greater Beirut from Syrian-controlled areas. The directive 
also authorized “ U.S. naval forces to provide naval gunfire and air support against any units in 
Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon firing into greater Beirut…”[8]  
In early 1984, Reagan was faced with making a crucial decision at a critical juncture. The U.S. ’ 
military and diplomatic efforts were not yielding desired results. In addition, Reagan was facing 
reelection in the U.S. and could not afford to make more mistakes in the Lebanese crisis. During 
a National Security Council meeting in January 1984, the president asked his staff to develop a 
timetable for the phasing down of USMNF ashore while still planning for a continued presence 
offshore.  
By the end of February 1984, the Reagan administration accepted the fluidity of the situation in 
Lebanon. The administration could do nothing to stop Syria from forcing Lebanon to abrogate the 
May 17 Lebanon-Israel Agreement. Lebanon abrogated in exchange for Syria ’s guarantee of a 
cease fire and support for a government of national unification. The Reagan administration also 
recognized its shortcoming in credibility. In NSDD 128, Reagan asked for a plan to bolster 
confidence in U.S. commitments in the Middle East because of “the serious developments in 
Lebanon and the perceived erosion of U.S. credibility…”[9] Such a plan did not materialize.  
By April 1984, the withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel, ashore and offshore, became 
imminent. As Reagan was sending the U.S. Congress “four separate bills to attack the pressing 
and urgent problem of international terrorism,”[ 10] U.S. military personnel were abandoning its 
failed Lebanon peacekeeping mission. The Reagan administration subsequently disengaged from 
Lebanon, establishing a dependent path of disengagement that characterized the rest of 
Reagan’s term.  
The Bush Administration (1989–1992) 
U.S. policy toward Lebanon and the Middle East under the Bush administration was conducted 
with extreme caution. There were no grand schemes and there were no big plans. The Bush 
administration probed cautiously to avoid heightening expectations. There was a conscious effort, 
however, to understand the realities of Middle East politics.  
This low key and cautious approach brought considerable success for the process of peace in the 
region. Under the astute negotiating and deal-making of Secretary of State James Baker, the 
Bush administration was credited with opening the way for Israelis and Arabs to come to the 
peace table. Baker brokered many conferences in a short period of time, culminating in the 
historic October 1991 Madrid conference.  
Success in the Arab-Israeli conflict did not always translate to favorable consequences for U.S.-
Lebanese relationship. Even the historic Madrid conference only brought a small potential gain for 
Lebanon. The number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who would be able to go back to 
Palestine if an Arab-Israeli peace agreement was concluded was not significant. On the other 
hand, progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict meant shifting the focus away from Lebanon and 
sidestepping these other problems. Arguably, the U.S. could have made substantial contributions 
to these issues. Instead, they became lost opportunities.  
With the trauma of the Beirut bombings still fresh in the American public’s mind, the Bush 
administration was not ready to re-engage Lebanon. The administration did not begin any 
separate initiatives to improve U.S.-Lebanese relations. Lebanon just concluded a long and 
bloody civil war where the U.S. became a belligerent and paid the cost of such involvement. The 
U.S. was not about to become involved again. At best, policy toward Lebanon was simply linked 
to the overall Middle East peace process. At worst, Lebanon was ignored and considered 
untouchable.  
Lebanon may have become too difficult to justify as a national security interest. The Cold War 
was over; and the threat of Soviet expansion was no longer a viable reason for action. Protecting 
an inexpensive and stable supply of oil from the region was still a U.S. national security interest, 
but Lebanon was not an oil-producing state. Lebanon therefore did not constitute a U.S. strategic 
interest regarding oil. Absent a clear public justification for action, and considering the fear of 
risking and losing American lives to terrorist actions, the Bush administration largely ignored 
Lebanon.  
The U.S. removed itself from influencing Lebanon ’s future and left Syria to take the lead. The 
1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent formation of a U.S.-led coalition to liberate 
Kuwait compounded the complexity of U.S.-Lebanese relations. Eager to bring Syria into the 
coalition, the Bush administration was willing to ignore Syrian hegemony over a supposedly 
independent and sovereign Lebanese state. Lebanon came under Syrian hegemony politically 
under the guise of being the arbiter of Lebanon ’s warring factions. Over 30,000 Syrian military 
personnel stayed in Lebanon to protect such hegemony.  
The Clinton Administration (1993–2000)  
The Clinton administration did very little to advance U.S.-Lebanese relations. Other than 
discussions of when the U.S. would lift the travel ban for tourists and businesses and allowing 
American businesses to set up in Lebanon, the Clinton administration passed the opportunity to 
help reconstruct Lebanon. The Clinton administration too was stuck in the dependent path of 
doing nothing and subsuming Lebanon ’s interests under the larger Arab-Israeli peace process. 
Almost 10 years after the Beirut bombings, the U.S. was still unwilling to get involved in a country 
once considered a vital interest.  
With the executive branch unwilling to take on Lebanon, the legislative branch took the lead in 
promulgating policy. Throughout the 1990’s, legislators, many of them of Lebanese descent, took 
on the cause of some Lebanese Americans. U.S. policymaking toward Lebanon shifted from the 
executive to the legislative branch.  
Intense lobbying by Lebanese-American groups resulted in congressional hearings. The hearings 
resulted in the formulation of proposals on how the U.S. could help in Lebanon ’s reconstruction 
as well as formulating a proposed U.S. policy toward the country. These proposals laid the 
foundation for the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003.  
The Bush Administration (2001–Present) 
Early in the Bush administration’s term, the executive branch seemed poised to follow previous 
U.S. policy and continue to pay lip service to supporting Lebanon ’s sovereignty. Things changed 
after the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001. The Bush administration had 
justification to pursue a clear strategy on foreign policy and wage a global war on terrorism. To 
protect national security, the Bush administration advocated a more offensive posture that 
included the right to engage in preemptive strikes. In what has become known as the Bush 
Doctrine, the U.S. national security strategy aimed to fight international terrorism, especially the 
state sponsored variety, which included countries harboring terrorists. Another goal of the 
national security strategy was to promote greater freedom worldwide through democratic reforms, 
free enterprise, and the elimination of groups or nations that organize with the intention to stifle 
that progress through radical means.  
The new grand strategy was heavily influenced by political morality, and greatly affected present 
and future policy actions toward the Middle East peace process as well as Lebanon. The Bush 
administration’s foreign policy position institutionalized its moral commitment to support 
democratic rule, advance freedom, and increase emphasis on state independence and 
sovereignty. In a speech in November 2003, the president stated “the United States has adopted 
a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East ” and that “the advance of freedom 
is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country.”[11]  
In the new Bush strategy, the moral cause of advancing freedom and fighting global terrorism 
were enough justification for U.S. intervention. For Lebanon, this position provided an opening for 
changing its path and re-defining policy toward Lebanon. The events of September 11, 2001 
constituted a critical juncture and the Bush doctrine that evolved presented another possible path 
the Bush administration could take. By taking on terrorism, the “hands off” approach to Lebanon 
previous administrations followed could be altered. In September 2001, almost 18 years after the 
Beirut bombings, the effects and influence of Reagan’s “cut and run” policy in 1984 could now be 
reversed.  
Early indications are positive. By May 2003, Powell stated that Lebanon “could be a model for 
democracy and free trade in the region” and that the U.S. “supports an independent and 
prosperous Lebanon, free of all, all foreign forces.”[12] He stated these words following his 
meeting with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud (Christian), speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri 
(Shi’ite), and Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri (Sunni), the Lebanese triumvirate leadership in 
Lebanon ’s confessional system. Powell recognized the need for considering Lebanese concerns 
in the Middle East process. He stated that “there has to be another track in addition to the track 
that is laid out clearly in the roadmap, there has to be another track that deals with Syrian 
concerns and Lebanese concerns”[13] While still a part of a comprehensive Middle East 
approach, Lebanon was becoming an integral part.  
Congressional leadership continued to be engaged in shaping U.S. policy toward Lebanon under 
the Bush administration. More congressional hearings followed the 1997 ones when former 
president Amin Gemayel spoke, including one in 2003 when General Aoun was the key witness. 
The result was the passing of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act 
of 2003 (SALSRA). The act was signed into Public Law No. 108-175 by the president on 
December 12, 2003. This law aims “to halt Syrian support for terrorism, end its occupation of 
Lebanon, stop its development of weapons of mass destruction, cease its illegal importation of 
Iraqi oil, and hold Syria accountable for its role in the Middle East, and for other purposes.”[14]  
The Bush administration was also actively advocating Lebanese independence and sovereignty 
in the international community. Together with France, the U.S. sponsored UN Security Council 
Resolution 1559, calling for “the strict respect of Lebanon ’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity 
and political independence under the sole and exclusive authority of the government of Lebanon 
throughout Lebanon.”[15] Specifically aimed at trying to prevent an impending parliamentary vote 
on a constitutional amendment to permit the Syrian-backed Lebanese president to extend his 
term, the resolution stated the Lebanese presidential election should be “free and fair … 
according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence.”[16]  
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In the years following the 1983 Beirut bombings, U.S. policy toward Lebanon changed from full 
support of Lebanon ’s sovereignty and independence to acquiescing to Syrian hegemony over 
the country. Faced with the possibility of confronting terrorism, the U.S. followed a cautious 
approach and largely subsumed U.S. interests in Lebanon to U.S. interests in a broader Middle 
East peace process. In the process, Lebanon was largely ignored in favor of appeasing Syria.  
The Bush administration now has the opportunity to deviate from the dependent path of 
disengagement, reassess its treatment of Lebanon, and determine a new policy that will 
effectively serve U.S. strategic goals. Such a new policy would be consistent with the U.S. 
national security strategy of spreading liberal democracy and free markets worldwide, goals 
arguably more easily obtained in Lebanon than in other Middle Eastern countries with substantial 
U.S. involvement.  
Iraq is in the center of the Bush administration’s current national security strategy; it should be 
Lebanon. The U.S. road map to peace in the Middle East banks on success in democracy-
building in Iraq spilling over into other states in the region. Eventually it is hoped that the tide of 
peace would settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this strategy, Lebanese independence and 
transition to democracy would be a by-product of Iraqi democracy. But success in Iraq is proving 
to be elusive and I submit that democratizing Lebanon would be a more expedient and realistic 
way to show that an Arab nation could be democratic and economically prosperous. Lebanon has 
a democratic legacy and has the institutions necessary for democratization. Much more, its 
historical ties to the West make success more probable than Iraq.  
Many studies show Lebanon has the greatest potential for further democratic development 
among the Arab countries in the Middle East. Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg found that the 
presence of established institutions for effective legislature, the strength of a state’s parliament, 
could make transition to democracy less difficult.[17] Taking Syrian hegemony out of the equation 
and focusing solely on the relationship between the legislative branch and the executive branch, 
Lebanon’s legislature is strong and can play an active role in the democratization process. It has 
an established constitution, is autonomous, and is capable of resisting the executive branch if 
necessary. Further, it has the resources to effectively influence state decision-making.  
It would behoove U.S. policymakers to consider the possibility of making Lebanon the lynchpin to 
Middle East peace. Lebanon certainly has the potential to become a model for democracy, much 
more than Iraq does. Lebanon was once the only democratic Arab state in the Middle East. It 
could once again occupy that distinction. A stable and democratic Lebanon with a free market 
economy is a potential intermediary between the West and the Middle East nations. Lebanon 
served the role of a merchant nation before and it could fit in to that role again. The U.S. made a 
commitment toward spreading democracy, most especially in the Middle East. Lebanon is still the 
best candidate and arguably a less costly way of propagating democratic peace. If the U.S. 
succeeds in helping Lebanon become a model for democracy and free trade, the rest of the 
region may follow. The Bush administration should fully commit to a path of engagement and 
support for a sovereign, independent and democratic Lebanon.[18]  
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